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Abstract  Governments use industrial policy to promote the development of new industries and 
the creation and adoption of new technologies.  Such policy involves subsidies granted to 
producers and consumers, usually for the purpose of correcting a market failure.  Concerning 
renewable energies such as wind energy and solar energy, China, the United States, and the 
European Union provide extensive support to producers and consumers.  This support has 
resulted in trade frictions among these nations.  This paper discusses the relationship between 
industrial policy and trade disputes in renewable energy.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
Renewable energies including solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass energy are used in about 2 
percent of total U.S. electricity generation.  The use of renewable energy and forecasts of its 
growth are low because the cost of renewable energy-fired electricity is greater than that of its 
main competitor, combined-cycle natural gas (natural gas or synthesis natural gas made from 
coal), as seen in Table 1.  Few analysts believe that this will change any time soon.   Also, 
renewable energy sources are capital intensive compared with combined-cycle natural gas.  In 
deregulated electricity markets, investors lack any guarantee that capital costs will be recovered 
from customers.  Therefore, investors tend to desire technologies that have higher marginal but 
lower capital costs, such as combined-cycle natural gas.  However, advocates of renewable 
energy argue that the demand for renewables would increase if conventionally generated 
electricity were priced to reflect its pollution cost.   
 
Governments use “industrial policy” to promote the development of new industries, such as 
renewable energy, and the creation and adoption of new technologies.  Such policy involves 
government subsidies granted to producers and consumers, usually for the goal of correcting a 
market failure.  For example, renewable energy is heavily subsidized in China, the United States, 
the European Union, and elsewhere.  Among the main motivations for subsidizing renewable 
energy are to decrease carbon emissions and dependence on foreign oil, to diversify sources of 
energy and foster entrepreneurial ingenuity and the positive spillover effects on innovation, to 
promote new innovations that will drive down the cost of using the new technology, and to 
create jobs.  These subsidies artificially decrease the price of energy paid by consumers, increase 
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the price received by producers, or reduce the cost of production.  
 
However, large-scale industrial policies can promote trade conflicts among competing nations, 
as seen in renewable energy.  The U.S.-China renewable-energy trade dispute and the dispute 
involving Brazil and the United States are examples of such conflicts.  This paper examines the 
use of industrial policies to promote wind energy and solar power production in light of trade 
frictions that have surfaced between the United States and China.  These frictions are likely to 
become more frequent as countries continue to enact policies to promote their renewable energy 
industries. 
  
           
2.  Dynamic Comparative Advantage and Industrial Policy 
 
David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage has influenced international trade theory and 
policy for almost 200 years. It implies that nations are better off by promoting free trade and 
allowing competitive markets to determine what should be produced and how.  Ricardian theory 
emphasizes specialization and reallocation of existing resources found domestically. It is 
essentially a static theory that does not allow for a dynamic change in industries’ comparative 
advantage or disadvantage over the course of several decades. The theory overlooks the fact that 
additional resources can be made available to the trading nation because they can be created or 
imported. (Ricardo, 1817) 
 
The remarkable postwar economic growth of the East Asian countries appears to be based on a 
modification of the static concept of comparative advantage. The Japanese were among the first 
to recognize that comparative advantage in a particular industry can be created through the 
mobilization of skilled labor, technology, and capital. They also realized that, in addition to the 
business sector, government can establish policies to promote opportunities for change through 
time. Such a process is known as dynamic comparative advantage. When government is actively 
involved in creating comparative advantage, the term industrial policy applies. 
 
In its simplest form, industrial policy is a strategy to revitalize, improve, and develop an 
industry. Proponents maintain that government should enact policies that encourage the 
development of emerging, "sunrise" industries, such as high-technology.  This strategy requires 
that resources be directed to industries in which productivity is highest, linkages to the rest of the 
economy are strong, and future competitiveness is important. Presumably, the domestic economy 
will enjoy a higher average level of productivity and will be more competitive in world markets 
as a result of such policies. 
 
A variety of government policies can be used to foster the development and revitalization of 
industries; examples are antitrust immunity, tax incentives, R&D subsidies, loan guarantees, 
low-interest-rate loans, and trade protection. Creating comparative advantage requires 
government to identify the "winners" and encourage resources to move into industries with the 
highest growth prospects. 
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To better understand the significance of dynamic comparative advantage, we might think of it in 
terms of the classic example of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage.  (Carbaugh, 2011)  
His example showed that, in the eighteenth century, Portugal and England would each have 
gained by specializing respectively in the production of wine and cloth, even though Portugal 
might produce both cloth and wine more cheaply than England. According to static comparative-
advantage theory, both nations would be better off by specializing in the product in which they 
had an existing comparative advantage. 
 
However, by adhering to this prescription, Portugal would sacrifice long-run growth for short-
run gains. If Portugal adopted a dynamic theory of comparative advantage instead, it would 
specialize in the growth industry of that time (cloth). The Portuguese government (or Portuguese 
textile manufacturers) would thus initiate policies to foster the development of its cloth industry. 
This strategy would require Portugal to think in terms of acquiring or creating strength in a 
"sunrise" sector instead of simply accepting the existing supply of resources and using that 
endowment as productively as possible. 
 
Countries have used industrial policies to develop or revitalize basic industries, including steel, 
autos, chemicals, transportation, and other important manufactures. Each of these industrial 
policies differs in character and approach; common to all is an active role for government in the 
economy. Usually, industrial policy is a strategy developed collectively by government, 
business, and labor through some sort of tripartite consultation process.  However, many people 
are dubious of the merits of industrial policy, because they are skeptical about the ability of 
governments to correctly identify and then to correct market failures. (Rodrik, 2009)    
 
Advocates of industrial policy typically cite Japan as a nation that has been highly successful in 
penetrating foreign markets and achieving rapid economic growth. Following World War II, the 
Japanese were the high-cost producers in many basic industries (such as steel). In this situation, a 
static notion of comparative advantage would require the Japanese to look to areas of lesser 
disadvantage that were more labor-intensive (such as textiles). Such a strategy would have 
forced Japan into low-productivity industries that would eventually compete with other East 
Asian nations having abundant labor and modest living standards. 
 
Instead, the Japanese invested in basic industries (steel, autos, and later electronics, including 
computers) that required intensive employment of capital and labor. From a short-run, static 
perspective, Japan appeared to pick the wrong industries. But from a long-run perspective, those 
were the industries in which technological progress was rapid, labor productivity rose quickly, 
and unit costs decreased with the expansion of output. They were also industries in which one 
would expect rapid growth in demand as national income increased. 
 
These industries combined the potential to expand rapidly, thus adding new capacity, with the 
opportunity to use the latest technology and thus promote a strategy of cost reduction founded on 
increasing productivity. Japan, placed in a position similar to that of Portugal in Ricardo's 
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famous example, refused to specialize in "wine" and chose "cloth" instead. Within three decades, 
Japan became the world's premier low-cost producer of many of the products for which it 
initially started in a high-cost position. 
 
However, critics of industrial policy contend that the causal factor in Japanese industrial success 
is unclear. They admit that some of the Japanese government's targeted industries--such as 
semiconductors, steel, shipbuilding, and machine tools--are probably more competitive than they 
would have been in the absence of government assistance. But they assert that Japan also 
targeted some losers, such as petrochemicals and aluminum, for which the returns on investment 
were disappointing and capacity had to be reduced. Moreover, several successful Japanese 
industries did not receive government assistance--motorcycles, bicycles, paper, glass, and 
cement. 
 
Industrial-policy critics contend that if all trading nations took the route of using a combination 
of trade restrictions on imports and subsidies on exports, a "beggar-thy-neighbor" process of 
trade-inhibiting protectionism would result. They also point out that the implementation of 
industrial policies can result in pork-barrel politics, in which politically powerful industries 
receive government assistance. Also, it is argued that in a free market, profit-maximizing 
businesses have the incentive to develop new resources and technologies that change a country's 
comparative advantage. This incentive raises the question of whether the government does a 
better job than the private sector in creating comparative advantage. (Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2010) 
 
 
3.  China’s Renewable Energy Program and Industrial Policy 
 
China is the is the world’s most populous country with over 1.3 billion people.  During the last 
three decades, it has experienced tremendous economic growth, with an annual average increase 
in gross domestic product of 9.8 percent during that period.  This has resulted in an increasing 
demand for energy, causing China to add an average of 53 gigawatts of electric capacity each 
year over the last ten years to its power generation capabilities.  China is also the world’s largest 
producer and consumer of coal, with about half of its coal being used for electricity generation.  
In fact, coal provides over 70 percent of China’s current electricity needs and fuels much of the 
new power generation capacity being built. (Howell, et. al, 2010) 
 
However, the burning of coal contributes to air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.  Also, 
the growth potential for hydropower, China’s main source of renewable energy, is increasingly 
limited by environmental and social problems associated with the construction of large dams.  
Because China cannot meet its increasing electric power demand by relying on conventional 
sources–including coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and hydropower–the Chinese 
government is subsidizing renewable energy.  Although governments in the United States, 
Europe, Canada, and Japan have enacted policies to promote their renewable energy industries, 
China’s effort is striking given its ambitious scale and the speed with which it is being enacted. 
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(Campbell, 2010) 
 
China largely operates as a command and control economy in which the national government 
assumes a dominant role.  Many of China’s industries, including much of the energy sector, 
consist of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which must conform to the laws and regulations 
governing the economy and also government directives regarding investments, purchasing 
practices, prices, mergers, research and development, and market entry and exit.  Since the 
economic reforms of 1978, China’s economy has become somewhat less centralized and the 
government has made greater use of market incentives instead of commands to influence 
enterprise behavior, but the government’s impact on the market remains strong. 
 
China’s government has enacted ambitious targets for developing its non-hydropower renewable 
energy resources in the last few years.  China recognizes that given the increasing demand for 
energy at home, developing its domestic renewable energy industry and building manufacturing 
capacity can result in advantages in future export markets.  Although the Chinese government’s 
goal is to turn its wind energy and solar panel industries into global leaders, energy efficiency 
and conservation are officially China’s top energy priority. 
 
To encourage the development of renewable energy industries, China’s government provides 
preferential financing, value-added-tax rebates, tax incentives, local content laws, procurement 
preferences for Chinese-owned and controlled companies, and research and development (R&D) 
subsidies for renewable energy equipment producers.  Direct subsidies are granted earlier in the 
time line of R&D projects for renewable energy, while tax incentives are applied later in the 
cycle to assist manufacturing ventures or to encourage consumers to adopt the technologies and 
help to increase demand for renewable energy.  Such support has resulted in a rapid increase in 
investment in the production of renewable energy equipment.  To finance the subsidization of the 
development of renewable energy, China charges a fee to all electricity users of about 0.029 
cents per kilowatt-hour.  In justifying its subsidies, some of which appear to be in violation of 
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China maintains that as a developing country 
it should be judged less strictly than an economically advanced country such as the United 
States. (Karp and Stevenson, 2012) 
 
Moreover, China maintains a comprehensive set of rules governing government procurement of 
goods and services.  These laws require government departments to purchase only domestic 
goods and services except where these items are not available within the borders of China or 
cannot be purchased at reasonable commercial terms (defined as 20 percent more expensive than 
foreign products) or where the items to be procured are for use abroad.  Although China became 
a member of the WTO in 2001, it has not yet signed the WTO’s Government Procurement 
Agreement that enforces open access to domestic procurement markets. A number of European 
producers of electricity generating equipment have protested China’s policy, claiming that it 
makes it burdensome for them to participate in China’s energy market.  However, China defends 
its buy national program as being consistent with similar programs in other WTO countries. 
(Matechak and Gerson, 2010) 
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The United States also uses industrial policy to promote the use of renewable energies as 
desirable substitutes for conventional fossil fuels.  Governmental subsidies have included 
subsidized loans, tax breaks, cash grants, and regulations such as California's mandate that its 
utilities buy 33 percent of their power from clean-energy sources by 2020.  Such subsidies mask 
the true cost of generating electricity from those sources.  According to the companies involved, 
some solar and wind power projects would have been built even without the assistance of gov 
ernment subsidies, but others such as a $229 million wind farm in New Hampshire might not 
have happened without government assistance. (Lipton and Krauss, 2011) 
4.  Local-Content Subsidies Assist China’s Wind Turbine Producers 
 
The wind power industry provides an example of China’s industrial policy.  Judging by the hum 
of its wind turbine factory in Tianjin, China in 2010, the Spanish firm Gamesa appeared to be a 
successful player in the energy industry it helped create.  Gamesa is the world’s third largest 
wind turbine producer, after Vestas of Denmark and General Electric of the United States.  But 
as Gamesa found out, doing business in China required it to adhere to strict rules set by the 
Chinese government. (Bradsher, 2010)  
 
For example, almost all the components that Gamesa assembles into million-dollar turbines in 
Tianjin are produced by local companies that Gamesa helped develop to fulfill local content 
requirements. And these are the same companies that lower Gamesa’s market share in wind 
turbines by selling parts to other Chinese producers that compete against Gamesa in the turbine 
market.  During 2005-2010, the upstarts captured more than 85 percent of the wind turbine 
market, aided by low-interest loans, export credits from China’s Export-Import Bank, and a 
variety of other subsidies.  As a result, Gamesa’s market share fell from about 33 percent of the 
Chinese market to only 3 percent during this period.   However, Gamesa did not complain.  
Although the company’s market share  tumbled, the country’s wind turbine market grew so big 
that Gamesa was able to sell more than twice as many turbines in China in 2010 as it did when it 
was the market leader in 2005.  So as Gamesa’s executives see it, they made the right bet by 
coming to China. 
 
With its relatively low Spanish labor costs, Gamesa became an early favorite at the turn of the 
century when China began buying significant numbers of imported wind turbines.  However, 
besides ordering imported turbines, Bejing began slipping new provisions into the bidding 
requirements for some state-run wind farms, requiring more and more of the content of turbines 
to be equipment produced within China, not imported.  Those piecemeal requirements soon led 
to a blanket local content requirement in which China’s wind farms had to buy equipment in 
which at least 70 percent of the value was domestically manufactured.  Wind farms not meeting 
the requirement of the local content law were not allowed to be built. 
 
Although trade lawyers maintained that enacting a local content requirement was a violation of 
the rules of the WTO, which China joined in 2001, China ignored such warning and bet correctly 
that Gamesa and other multinationals would not risk losing a piece of China’s booming wind 
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farm business by complaining to trade officials in their home countries.  It was not until 2009, 
when President Barack Obama began looking at barriers to American renewable energy exports, 
that the United States began to press China about its local content regulation (the United States 
does not have local content laws).  The story of Gamesa in China follows an industrial arc traced 
in other businesses, like solar panels and desktop computers.   Chinese companies acquire the 
latest Western technology by various means and then take advantage of government subsidies to 
become low-cost suppliers. 
 
The U.S. challenge to China’s industrial policy was in response to a petition filed by the United 
Steelworkers in 2010.  (United Steelworkers, 2010)  The petition sought action against a wide 
range of allegedly WTO-inconsistent Chinese policies on wind and solar energy products, 
advanced batteries, energy-efficient vehicles, and other products..  However, the U.S. 
government only challenged China’s wind power equipment subsidies, claiming that the Chinese 
government subsidizes its wind turbine manufacturers that use parts and components produced in 
China, instead of imports.  Subsidy grants to individual manufacturers ranged from $6.7 million 
to $22.5 million.  These subsidies allowed Chinese manufacturers to sell turbines and related 
equipment on international markets at cheaper prices than their competitors.  The “local content” 
nature of these subsidies also operated as a barrier to U.S. parts and component exports to China 
and are prohibited under WTO rules, according to U.S. officials.  Following the U.S. challenge, 
the Chinese government revoked its local-content subsidy program.  As a result, American 
manufacturers could produce wind turbine parts and components here in the United States and 
sell them to China.  However, the program was no longer needed at that point since the 
objectives of local content were largely fulfilled–some of Gamesa’s wind turbines exceeded 95 
percent Chinese content.  
 
With the help of China’s industrial policies, Chinese companies have grown to control about half 
of the global market for wind turbines.  China’s biggest turbine makers, Sinovel Wind Group and 
Xinjian Goldwind Science and Technology, are now taking aim at foreign markets, particularly 
the United States, where General Electric has long been the leader.   
 
 
5.  WTO Rules Against China’s Hoarding of Rare Earth Metals 
 
Dozens of key green technologies, including solar panels and wind turbines, depend on critical 
raw materials derived from rare earth elements and other minerals, such as zinc.  Frequently, 
there are no substitutes for these minerals in green technology applications, due to their unique 
physical and chemical properties.  China produces more than 90 percent of the world’s supply of 
these essential minerals.  The United States currently produces no rare earth raw materials at all.    
To restrict exports of rare earth minerals to users in the United States and other countries, China 
uses export quotas, taxes, and licensing procedures.  Such a policy benefits China’s producers of 
wind farm equipment and solar panels at the expense of foreign competitors. 
 
Why would China restrict the export of raw materials and thus decrease the world supply?  By 
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restricting export sales, the supply of raw materials in the domestic market will increase, 
reducing the price faced by domestic buyers.  Also, by limiting the export of a good and thus 
decreasing world supply, the world price of the export good may be driven upward, improving 
the exporting country’s terms of trade.  Moreover, the exporting country may want to conserve a 
scarce resource.  Finally, export limitations on raw materials would increase the domestic 
manufacturers’ access to raw materials needed in production, and also hold down the cost of 
these inputs, giving them a competitive advantage in global markets.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of Chinese export tariffs applied to zinc, a rare-earth metal.  
Assume that China produces a large share of total world output of zinc.  In the figure, SC denotes 
China’s domestic supply curve, DC its domestic demand curve, and DC+W the total world demand 
curve for zinc.  The distance between DC and DC+W at each price denotes the rest of the world’s 
demand for zinc.  Equilibrium occurs where supply curve SC intersects demand curve DC+Wt.  At 
this point, China would produce 9 million pounds, of which 4 million pounds are sold 
domestically and 5 million pounds are exported.  A price of $1.05 would apply to both domestic 
sales and exports.   
 
Now assume that China imposes a tax of $0.30 on each pound of zinc that is exported.  A tax on 
foreign buyers decreases the amount they are willing to pay Chinese sellers, so the demand curve 
shifts downward, from DC+W to DC+W (Tax).  Equilibrium occurs where the new demand curve 
intersects the supply curve at a quantity of 7 million pounds, with 5 million pounds sold in China 
and 2 million pounds exported abroad. Foreign consumers pay $1.20 per pound; this includes the 
lower price of $0.90 going to Chinese producers and $0.30 going to the Chinese government as 
tax revenue.  However, Chinese consumers pay only $0.90 per pound because the export tax does 
not apply to them.  Simply put, China’s export tax on zinc results in a combination of a lower 
domestic price and a higher world price.  An alternative scheme for restricting exports is the 
implementation of an export quota, which can yield the same effects on prices and volume.     
 
Concerning the environment, China does not impose stringent regulations on mining rare earths 
like many other countries do.  For example, in China, the waste from rare earth mining is pumped 
into artificial ponds with earthen dams where the seepage and waste has caused health-related 
issues.  The lack of stringent environmental regulations gives China’s producers a cost advantage 
compared to their foreign competitors.    
 
In defending its trade policy, China contended that its export restrictions are essential to protect 
its environment and scarce resources.  WTO rules allow export controls for environmental 
reasons, as long as such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.  However, such restrictions cannot be used to discriminate against 
users and refiners of materials in other nations. 
 
The United States and other complainants in the natural resource case maintained that China’s 
export restrictions were a discriminatory protectionist policy.  The effect of these restrictions was 
to reduce the supply of key resources abroad and drive up world prices higher than China’s 
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domestic prices.  This disadvantaged foreign producers that used these resources as inputs and 
that competed against the Chinese.  Also, steps to limit sales of raw materials abroad were seen as 
a bid by China to attract more manufacturing to its shores. 
 
In 2011, the World Trade Organization ruled that China had no legal right to impose export 
restrictions on nine rare earth metals.  The ruling was a setback to China’s policy of hoarding 
rare-earth metals.  In response to the ruling, China said that it would make modifications to its 
export controls to avoid penalties.  At the writing of this paper, it remains to be seen how these 
modifications will play out. 
 
 
6.  U.S. Solar Industry Dims as China’s Industrial Policy Lights Up  
 
Solar energy has been harnessed by humans since ancient times using a range of ever-evolving 
technologies.  Although there is no denying solar energy’s promise and potential, debate remains 
about how the industry should develop.  Should the market be relied on to determine winners and 
losers or should industrial policy carry out the task? 
 
The bankruptcy of three American solar power companies in 2011 left China’s industry with a 
dominant sales position, about two thirds of the market.  Another major producer of solar energy 
equipment, Germany, was also retrenching in that year.   Although some American, Japanese, and 
European solar equipment companies had a technological edge over their Chinese rivals, they 
maintained that they could not beat the Chinese when it came to cost.  They noted that the 
Chinese government has been particularly effective in developing an industrial policy that 
provides its manufacturers with a number of advantages in the global solar industry, including 
access to lower cost capital, subsidized electricity rates, free access to land, and much a shortened 
permitting process for factories.  Also, China’s solar energy producers have realized huge 
economies of scale that result in decreasing production cost and increased competitiveness.   
 
At the heart of the solar industry’s problems in 2011 were sharply decreasing prices for solar 
panels and their components–wafers, cells, polysilicon, and the modules themselves.  The reason 
was obvious: There were simply too many manufacturers trying to sell their products.  The glut of 
manufacturers was due to factors including efforts by the U.S. government to promote clean 
technology, venture capitalists pouring into the sector, investors purchasing stock issues of solar 
companies during an upswing in oil prices, and an increased sense of urgency for climate change.  
Also, European governments offered substantial subsidies for solar installation, stimulating 
demand in the market.  The abundant production of solar panels resulted in cutthroat price 
competition.  In 2010, solar panels sold for $1.60 per watt, on average.  By 2011, the going price 
was between 90 cents per watt and $1.05 per watt.  Despite a buyers’ market, customers were not 
purchasing solar panels fast enough to match the increase in supply.  The result was the 
bankruptcy of numerous producers.     
 
The bankruptcy of Solyndra, Inc. in 2011,  a California company making solar panels, received 
much publicity.  In 2010, President Obama visited Solyndra and touted it as a leading company in 
a growing industry.  However, the company found that it could not compete with cheaper 
Chinese-manufactured solar panels, so it defaulted on its government-guaranteed loan of $535 
million.  This resulted in attacks by critics of Obama who tried to make the failed solar panel 
 
        Carbaugh and St. Brown, Journal of International and Global Economic Studies, 5(1), June 2012, 1-16 
 
10
company both a symbol of the failure of industrial policy in solar energy and a club with which to 
beat alternative renewable energy of all kinds.  
 
 
7.  U.S. Files AntiSubsidy/AntiDumping Case Against China’s Solar Panel Makers 
 
In October 2011, seven American makers of solar panels filed a broad trade case in Washington 
D.C. against the Chinese solar panel industry, accusing it of using billions of dollars in 
government subsidies to help gain sales in the American market.  The companies also accused 
China of dumping solar panels in the United States for less than it costs to manufacture and ship 
them.  The trade case seeks tariffs of more than 100 percent on the wholesale price of solar panels 
from China, which shipped $1.6 billion of the panels to the United States in the first eight months 
of 2011. (Bradsher 2011) 
 
The coalition of solar panel makers is led by SolarWorld Industries America, the largest maker of 
conventional solar panels in the United States.  The coalition maintains that American solar 
operations should be rapidly expanding to keep pace with the strong demand for these products.  
However, in August 2011, Solyndra and two other American solar companies filed for 
bankruptcy protection, citing the plunging prices of solar technology from China.  Many of the 
surviving companies, meanwhile, were laying off workers and closing factories, or setting up 
shop in China.  According to the coalition, there is one primary explanation for this: Without any 
production cost advantage, dumping by Chinese solar manufacturers and massive subsidies by the 
Chinese government are enabling Chinese producers to drive out U.S. competition, a violation of 
WTO rules. 
 
In December 2011, the U.S. International Trade Commission voted to continue investigating U.S. 
solar firms’ allegations of dumping by Chinese solar-panel makers, saying there were indications 
of injury or threat of injury to U.S. industry.  (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2011)  This 
decision clears the way for the U.S. Department of Commerce, which is also investigating the 
accusations, to continue its probe.  If the Commerce Department concludes that Chinese solar-
panel makers dumped their products and/or received unfair subsidies, then the International Trade 
Commission would determine if the U.S. solar industry was injured or threatened with injury.  An 
affirmative decision by the International Trade Commission would allow the Commerce 
Department to impose antidumping or countervailing tariffs on such products. 
 
In response to increased trade tensions with the Obama administration, in December 2011 the 
Chinese government imposed higher tariffs on imports of sports utility vehicles and midsize and 
large cars from the United States.  The new tariffs included antidumping duties of 8.9 percent for 
G.M. vehicles, 8.8 percent for Chrysler, 2.7 percent for Daimler, and 2 percent for BMW.  The 
Chinese government also imposed additional antisubsidy duties of 12.9 percent for G.M. and 6.2 
percent for Chrysler.  All of the new duties are calculated on vehicle prices that include China's 
existing 25 percent import tariff for all family vehicles.  The duties will be in place for two years, 
through December, 2013.  China's import duties exceed those of other big auto producing 
countries.  The United States, for example, imposes a tariff of 2.5 percent on imported cars, 
minivans, and S.U.V.'s. 
Basically, there are four steps in making a solar panel.  (1) Molten polysilicon is used to grow 
crystals or cast blocks of polycrystalline silicon; (2) the material is cut and polished into thin, 
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smooth wafers; (3) the wafer is chemically treated and combined with electrical contacts to turn it 
into a solar cell; and (4) 62 or 70 solar cells are connected, covered with glass, enclosed in an 
aluminum frame and combined with a electrical junction box.  The U.S. trade case has been filed 
against solar panels for which either of the final two steps–turning the wafer into a cell or 
assembling cells into a panel–was done in China.  Although Chinese manufacturers want to keep 
wafer production in China, they have reportedly been making plans to ship wafers to Taiwan or 
South Korea for conversion into cells, as one way to potentially avoid any new tariffs the U.S. 
government might decide to impose.  That step is the costliest, most high-tech and most highly 
automated task in producing solar panels, representing about a third of the total cost.  Chinese 
manufacturers have studied moving solar cell factories directly to the United States but have 
largely rejected it in favor of other countries because it takes so long to comply with the many 
American regulations for opening new factories that use a lot of chemicals.  Any cells made in 
Taiwan or South Korea from Chinese wafers could be shipped to the United States for final 
assembly, a step that typically accounts for a little less than a fifth of the total cost of making a 
solar panel. (Bradsher, 2011)  
 
However, SolarWorld’s petition for antidumping duties and countervailing duties has met strong 
opposition from much of the American solar industry which has formed the Coalition for 
Affordable Solar Energy (CASE); its members include solar project developers and installers, 
companies that manufacture solar equipment and polysilicon, and the like.  CASE maintains that 
import duties on solar panels and cells would raise prices and slow the growth in domestic 
demand for photovoltaic systems (which convert sunlight to electricity) by homeowners, 
businesses, and power producers, resulting in lost jobs.   A study commissioned by CASE, and 
conducted by The Brattle Group, estimates that a 100 percent tariff on imported solar cells and 
panels from China would eliminate between 16,900 and 49,600 American jobs over a three-year 
period following the implementation of the tariff, minus any jobs created in cell or solar panel 
manufacturing.  The study concludes that, even under the most conservative assumptions, the 
imposition of a tariff would eliminate far more jobs than it creates.  And all this is about 
protecting one troubled company, SolarWorld, which creates only 2-3 percent of U.S. solar 
industry jobs. (The Brattle Group, 2012)  In December, 2011 CASE sent a letter to SolarWorld 
urging it to withdraw its trade petition.  However, the request was rejected. 
 
CASE also fears that the Chinese solar industry will retaliate by filing an anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy trade case of its own with China’s Commerce Ministry.  The most likely target would be 
American exports of polysilicon, the main material used in making conventional solar panels.  
The manufacture of polysilicon requires enormous amounts of electricity in the production 
process.  It turns out that the United States is one of the world’s largest producers of polysilicon, 
in states like Washington and Tennessee, because it has access to a lot of inexpensive 
hydroelectric power.  And most of that polysilicon is exported.  A retaliatory tariff placed on U.S. 
exports of polysilicon to China would threaten 11,000 American jobs, according to The Brattle 
Group.  At the writing of this paper, the outcome of this trade dispute remains in question.       
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8.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the affects of industrial policy on the renewable energy industry and its 
potential to cause trade conflicts between competing nations. Indeed, many nations have used a 
variety of subsidies to foster the competitiveness of their clean energy producers.  Countries from 
the United States and Germany to Brazil and China are trying to boost power derived from crops, 
the wind, and the sun in order to lower emissions of greenhouse gases while increasing the 
security of energy supplies.  Other motivations for subsidizing renewable energy are to decrease 
dependence on foreign oil, promote entrepreneurial ingenuity and the positive spillover effects on 
innovation, encourage new innovations that will drive down the cost of using the new technology, 
and to create jobs.  However, many people are dubious of the merits of industrial policy because 
they are skeptical about the ability of governments to pick winners. 
The command and control economy of China has resulted in its government owning or 
controlling many of the country’s enterprises and setting goals for economic development.  China 
has emphasized the development of new industries, such as wind turbines and solar panels, which 
can feed into the future growth of its economy.  China has made good use of its renewable energy 
subsidies in that it has become the leading producer of wind and solar technology. Also, it is 
producing green technology at a scale that could dramatically bring down the price of goods like 
solar panels and wind turbines, making them affordable for both the developed and developing 
world. 
   
Because of China’s lack of transparency, it has taken significant investigatory efforts by the U.S. 
government, working with industry and workers, to uncover the subsidies that have been 
successfully challenged at the WTO.  Under WTO rules, China is obligated to submit information 
about all of its subsidy programs on a regular basis, as must all other WTO members.  Despite 
this obligation, China never notified the WTO of its subsidies to its producers of wind power 
equipment and solar panels that have been the focus of recent WTO disputes.  This lack of 
transparency hinders efforts of WTO members to collectively ensure that each government is 
playing by the rules and it threatens to progress into retaliatory tariffs.  Therefore, transparency 
and international cooperation are of ultimate importance to avoid a process of trade inhibiting 
protectionism. 
 
One of the few goods that this statement may not hold true is rare earth, because China has a near 
monopoly on its extraction.  China may be able to attain greater surplus for its citizens by 
withholding some of its rare earth reserves.  Realizing this, the United States must be willing to 
work with China and consider making compromises--such as, if China will decrease its export 
taxes on rare earth, the United States will be less strict about proposals to place import duties on 
solar panels and cells.  To place pressure on China, in March 2012 President Obama lodged a 
formal request for consultations with China at the WTO, the first step toward filing a legal case 
against the Chinese government over its hoarding of rare earth metals.  The United States was 
joined in its request by the European Union and Japan.  However, given China's robust defense of 
its trade policies, this legal challenge may drag on for several years. 
 
The use of industrial policy for developing key industries will likely continue for China, despite 
complaints of the United States and other European countries.  However, China is in a tight spot 
because if it invests in clean technology, U.S. industries will claim that China is engaging in 
unfair trade practices.  But if it does not, the U.S. government threatens to impose a high carbon 
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tariff on Chinese imports.  This is a no win situation, according to the Chinese.  Simply put, the 
trade disputes between the United States and China regarding energy will likely take years to 
simmer down.  Instead, these disputes may intensify as the two countries continue to promote the 
development of the energy industry. 
 
 
Endnote    
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Table 1. Levelized Cost of Electricity-Generating Technologies: Brought in Line in 2016* 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 Plant Type    Cost Per Kilowatt Hour (Cents) 
 
Coal 
    Conventional Coal     11.1 
    Advanced Coal      12.2 
Natural Gas Fired 
    Conventional Combined Cycle     7.4  
    Conventional CombustionTurbine   14.4 
    Advanced Combustion Turbine    11.8 
Advanced Nuclear      12.1 
Wind        11.5 
Wind, Offshore      34.9 
Solar Photovoltaic (PV)      32.4 
Solar Thermal       64.2 
Geothermal       11.6 
Biomass       13.3 
Hydro        12.1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Levelized cost represents the present value of the total cost of building and operating a 
generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle, converted to equal annualized 
payments and expressed in terms of real dollars to remove the impact of inflation.  This 
calculation does not include wider system costs associated with each type of plant, such as long 
distance connections to grids, and does not include externalities such as health damage by coal 
plants or decommissioning costs of a nuclear plant.  Also, government subsidies are not included 
in the calculations of levelized cost.  
 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 
2011, December 2010, DOE/EIA-0383 (2010) 
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     Figure 1. China's Export Tariff Applied to Rare Earth Metals   
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